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LEGISLATION
Administrative Law-The Scope of Official Notice
The doctrine of judicial notice, or the right of the judge to go outside the record for information relevant to the solution of a controversy, developed from the realization that there must be some limitation to the facts required to be proved at trial.' The same practical
consideration becomes more acute with respect to the problem of
official notice by administrative agencies.2 where the tribunal often

grapples with extremely complex problems3 with respect to which
volumes of evidence and testimony4 are often offered. As an adjudicator of disputes between adverse parties, the administrative tribunal
performs a function similar to that of a court. Nonetheless, there are
basic differences between courts and administrative agencies which
render inadequate for administrative application the rules developed
by the courts regarding the scope of judicial notice.
Administrative agencies are creatures of statute 5 some of which
have a two-fold function of rule-making and adjudication.6 While
both agencies and courts have a responsibility to protect the public
interest, the agency ordinarily is able to take a more active role in
1. "Its [judicial notice's] employment . . . at every stage of the judicial process

will greatly further the accomplishment of a chief objective of all sound procedure:
the elimination of issues as to which there is or can be no bona fide dispute." MORGAN,
SONM PROBLEMS OF PROOF UNDER THE ANGLO-AmERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 69
(1956).

"The trial of an ordinary suit would in many instances be interminably protracted
if every matter of fact were to be explored by customary methods. Fortunately . . .
judges have developed . . . 'a simplifying process . . . [whose] aim is to assume for
the purposes of the instant litigation certain elements which experience has shown to
be safely assumable."' Gellhorn, Official Notice in Administrative Adjudication, 20
TExAs LAw REv. 131, 136 (1941). (Footnote omitted.)
2. See generally MORGAN, op. cit. supra note 1; Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 CoLum.
L. REV. 945 (1955); Davis, Official Notice, 62 HAuv. L. REv. 537 (1949); Gellhorn,
supra note 1; McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore
Controversy, 14 VnDr. L. REv. 779 (1961); Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 I-uv. L. REv.
269 (1944); Note, 44 YALE L.J. 355 (1934).
3. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284 (1947), where the Interstate
Commerce Commission determined a controversy so complicated that the issues were
simplified at a pre-trial hearing attended by more than 400 people.
4. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948), where the Federal Trade
Commission dealt with a problem on which it took 49,000 pages of oral testimony and
50,000 pages of exhibits.
5. 1 DA is, ADMNmSTRATrvE LAW TRxAnS- 4 (1958).
6. Id. at 1-6.
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achieving the public good 7 than is the court, whose role is more often
one of passive decision making.8 In the administrative tribunal the
trier of fact is a "specialist" in his field.9 The extent to which the
administrative agency should employ the doctrine of official notice
in its adjudicative function to avail itself of expertise is one of the

paramount problems of administrative law.10 Primarily this problem
involves the development of a rule or standard which will effectively
recognize the need of the agency in performing its adjudicative
function to take advantage of its experience without eliminating an
essential ingredient of a fair hearing-the opportunity to offer rebuttal
to those materials which bear directly on the decision."
In dealing with this problem the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires only that each party have an opportunity to know
and meet in appropriate fashion the matter officially noticed.12 The

state court decisions do not declare such a coherent and unified principle. Indeed, support may be found for almost any position in the
7. "[T]he obligation on the agencies to develop all available facts in adjudications
Congress has assigned
is probably greater than the comparable obligations of courts ....
to each regulatory agency the affirmative duty of securing all relevant information,
whether produced by the parties or not." 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 377-78.
8. "It is not the function of the trier of fact either to know or to discover the truth,
or even to discover what the truth appears to be as disclosed by all available data, but
merely to find, for the sole purpose of settling the dispute between the litigants, what
the facts appear to be as disclosed by the materials submitted." Morgan, supra note
2, at 271-72.
9. Gellhorn, supranote 1, at 137.
10. "No other major problem of administrative law surpasses in practical importance
the problem of use of extra-record information in an adjudication." 2 DAVIs, op. cit.
supranote 5, at 338.
"The statement with which chapter 15 on official notice begins-that no other major
problem of administrative law is so much misunderstood-continues to be true." 1
DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5 (Supp. 1963, at 3).
Official notice by administrative agencies, in the sense in which it is used in this
paper, concerns notice by the agency tribunal of all facets of its expertise, not just of
the expertise accumulated in the course of the performance of its adjudicative function.
Records, data, and information which are the work-product of the rule-making function
are also included in the agency's expertise as that term is used herein.
11. 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 344.
12. In NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953), the Court held that
an administrative agency is not restricted to the record of the particular proceeding
in devising a remedy. In American Trucking Ass'ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S. 133
(1958), the Court rejected the plaintiff's objections to the Interstate Commerce Commission's taking notice of its own internal administrative practices and procedures,
stating that it failed to see what prejudices could have accrued thereby. Earlier the
Court had upheld the right of an agency to rely upon its own special knowledge
to draw inferences as to the possible effects of a given rate decrease. Market St. By.
v. Railroad Comm'n, 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
"Supreme Court decisions on official notice, properly interpreted, form a highly
satisfactory body of doctrine, perfectly consistent with the thesis that the sole test of
the validity of administrative resort to extra-record materials is whether or not the
parties have adequate opportunity to meet those materials in the appropriate fashion
2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 411.
.
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state court cases. 13

ALl MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
One possible solution to the problem of defining the scope of official

notice is that promulgated in rules 801, 802, and 803 of the American
Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence; 14 these have been substantially adopted in the Uniform Rules of Evidence of the Commis-

sioners on Uniform State Laws. 15 These rules provide for notice of

three groups of items:16 (1) the common law, public statutes, private
acts and resolves of legislative bodies, duly enacted ordinances, and
regulations of governmental agencies or divisions; (2) specific facts
and general knowledge so notorious as not to be the subject of dispute;
and (3) specific facts and general knowledge capable of "immediate
13. The decisions of courts in New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin and Connecticut,
for example, have reflected a liberal attitude toward the use of extra-record material
by an administrative agency, while decisions in Vermont, Pennsylvania and Illinois
evidence the more restricted view. Compare Jaffe v. State Dept. of Health, 135 Conn.
339, 64 A.2d 330 (1949), and Elizabeth Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Howell, 24 N.J.
488, 132 A.2d 779 (1957), and People ex rel. Fordham Manor Reformed Church v.
Walsh, 244 N.Y. 280, 155 N.E. 575 (1927), and McCarty v. Industrial Comm'n, 194
Wis. 198, 215 N.W. 824 (1927), with Smith v. Department of Registration, 412 Ill.
332,
106 N.E.2d 722 (1952), and In re Shenandoah Suburban Bus Lines, Inc., 355 Pa. 521,
50 A.2d 301 (1947), and City of Newport v. Newport Elec. Div. of Citizens Util. Co.,
116 Vt. 103,70 A.2d 590 (1950).
14. "Rule 801
The judge shall of his own motion take judicial notice of the common law
and public statutes in force in this State, and of such propositions of generalized
knowledge as are so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute.
Rule 802
The judge may of his own motion take judicial notice of
(a) private acts and resolves of the Congress of the United States and of the
legislature of this State and duly enacted ordinances and regulations of
governmental divisions or agencies of this State, and
(b) specific facts so notorious as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute, and
(c) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are capable
of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources
of indisputable accuracy, and
(d) the common law and public statutes of every other state, territory and
jurisdiction of the United States.
Rule 803
The judge shall take judicial notice of each matter specified in Rule 802 if a
party
(a) requests that judicial notice of it be taken, and
(b) furnishes the judge sufficient information to enable him properly to comply
with the request, and
(c) has given each adverse party such notice, if any, as the judge deems necessary to enable the adverse party fairly to prepare to meet the request."
MODEL CoDE OF EVwENcE rules 801-03 (1942).
15. UNoim RuLEs OF EvmNcE 9.
16. These three categories were originally so enumerated in 2 DAvis, op. cit. Supra
note 5, § 15.07.
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and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of
indisputable accuracy." 7 Although they are specifically directed to the
courts, Professor Edmund M. Morgan, who served as reporter to the
American Law Institute's Committee on Evidence, states that these
same rules should apply to official notice by administrative agencies
insofar as the agency is adjudicating a dispute between adverse
parties. 8 Rule 804(3)19 provides that unless the material in question
falls squarely within one of the categories of rules 801, 802, or 803
the judge shall decline to take notice of it. This requirement bolsters
the already restrictive nature of the specific enumerations in those
provisions. The Model Code does not provide for the challenging of
the truth of noticed facts after they have been noticed. However
under rule 806(2) the decision as to the propriety of notice under
rules 801-05 with respect to a given fact is subject to appellate
20
review.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis criticizes the application of these
provisions of the Model Code to administrative tribunals, 2 1 basing his
objections on the premise that, literally interpreted, the Code prohibits
the administrative tribunal from taking notice of many materials
necessary to the formulation of a proper solution. For example, he
asserts that under the Code an administrative agency is precluded
from taking notice of prior administrative decisions having the force of
law. "Surely the Institute could not have intended any such absurd
result."22 But the Institute did not in reality reach this result. Under
a realistic analysis the legislature delegates to the agency the power
to make the law, 2 outlining only the general policies to be followed.

Some of this delegated power is exercised in the rule making process,
and some of it is exercised in the course of deciding disputes between
17. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rule 802(c) (1942).
18. "[An administrative tribunal may take official notice of any matter subject to
judicial notice by the courts. In so far as the tribunal is performing a function identical
with that of a court . .. there is no reason why it should treat as indisputable any
matter that would be subject to dispute in court." MORcAN, BAsIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 15 (1961).
19. "If the information possessed by the judge, whether or not furnished by the
parties, fails to convince him that a matter falls clearly within Rules 801, 802 or 803,
he shall decline to take judicial notice thereof." MODEL CODE OF EvIDENcE rule 804(3)
(1942).
20. Review under rule 806(2) is concerned only with whether or not the material
should have been noticed in the first place, that is, whether or not it fits within one of
the enumerated categories. There is no review under the Model Code with respect
to the truth of noticed material once it has been noticed.
21. See 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 385-87.
22. Id. at 386.
23. "Congress may and does lawfully delegate legislative power to administrative
agencies. Lawyers who try to win cases by arguing that congressional delegations are
unconstitutional almost invariably do more harm than good to their clients' interests."1 DA vIs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 75.
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adverse parties. 24 Prior decisions of the agency ought therefore to
be subject to notice under the "common law" provisions of rules 801
and 802.
Professor Davis further asserts that under the Model Code a state
court would be precluded from noticing the regulations of federal
administrative agencies, which have the force of law. Under the
analysis above that the administrative agency performs its law making
process by virtue of a direct grant of legislative power, it is arguable
that a state court would be compelled to notice such federal regulations under the provision of rule 801 for the notice of the common
law and public statutes in force in the state, which according to the
comment following rule 801 includes acts of Congress. 25
Finally, Professor Davis asserts that legislative history, committee
reports and proceedings, historical facts, and other bodies of similarly
recorded information can not be noticed because they do not fall
within any of the enumerated categories and their sources "can hardly
be regarded as 'of indisputable accuracy.' "26 If by this Professor Davis
means that a committee report, for example, does not accurately
record what the committee says, he is obviously wrong.
Professor Davis seems to be correct in his conclusion as to the
desirability of a definition of the scope of official notice tailored to
the peculiar need of the administrative tribunal to take advantage of
its expertness. Such a definition is not to be found in the provisions
of the Model Code. The weakness of the Code's provisions when
applied to administrative tribunals is that their precise meaning is not
clear. Some stretching is required to achieve an intelligent application at all. The Code fails to set up a definition which clearly and
affirmatively grants the agency permission to take notice of its prior
experience and expertness. It is possible that the more important
components of this expertise can be included within the Model Code's
provisions by careful analysis. But the decision as to whether under
the Code to allow official notice of the agency's expertise should not
depend upon so variable a factor as the judgment of individual
triers of fact, among whom divergent decisions are possible concerning notice of the same material.0 The agency has a duty to examine
24. "Administrative law consists of constitutional law, statutory law, common law
and agency-made law." Id. at 4.
25. MODEL CoDE oF EviDENcE rule 801 and comment (142).
26. 2 DAvis, op. cit. supranote 5, at 386.
27. Review in such a case would concern only the reasonableness of the judgment
exercised by the trier of fact. The appellate court will not overturn such a judgment
if there is a reasonable basis for upholding it, even though the appellate court itself
might have reasoned differently. It can be argued that uniformity is not such a
desirable factor, and that between agencies the scope of official notice should differ,
bearing some kind of relationship to the degree of expertness of the agency relative
to the particular problem.
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all sources and formulate a ruling which will protect the interests
of the public at large 8 as well as those of the parties to the action.
In this respect the agency should be granted with preciseness and
clarity the right to draw upon its own resources within the field of
its expertness through the use of official notice.
DAvs

PROPOSAL

Professor Davis proposes that there should be a much broader
criterion for determining the propriety of taking official notice of
extra-record material, basing his assertions on his narrow interpretation of the Model Code's provisions.2 9 His position is basically this:
there are two types of facts used in every adversary proceeding,
legislative facts and adjudicative facts.30 Adjudicative facts are facts
about the parties, the facts to which law and policy are applied.
Going outside the record for adjudicative facts is improper; they
should be introduced at the first opportunity and every chance for
attack and rebuttal should be afforded. Legislative facts are those
general facts which help the tribunal decide issues of law and policy.
Extra-record legislative facts may or may not properly be noticed,
depending upon how important the facts are, how central they are to
the issue being decided, and the degree of doubt attached to their
truth. An essential requirement of Professor Davis' concept of official
notice is that the parties be afforded an opportunity to challenge the
noticed facts; 31 each party is entitled to the opportunity to meet in
appropriate fashion the materials of the opposition. The "appropriate
fashion" will in turn depend upon the nature of the fact, whether it
is legislative or adjudicative, and the importance and uncertainty of
28. "The very reason for the creation of most regulatory agencies was the need for

providing effective representation for a public interest not otherwise represented, a
need which courts because of their passive character could not supply." 2 DAVIS, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 378.
29. "Quite drastically out of line with (1) judicial practices, (2) administrative
practices, (3) holdings of courts, and (4) the Administrative Procedure Act are the
judicial notice provisions of the American Law Institutes Model Code of Evidence....
DAVIS, ArmNsnTnAT=VE LAW TEcr 279 (1959).
30. "The cardinal distinction which more than any other governs the use of extrarecord facts by courts and agencies is the distinction between legislative facts and
adjudicative facts. When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate
parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-the court
or agency is performing an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called
adjudicative facts. When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting
legislatively; the courts have created the common law through judicial legislation, and
the facts which inform the tribunars legislative judgment are called legislative facts."
2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 353.
31. "[T]he view of the American Law Institute to the contrary seems especially
unfortunate." 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 433.
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Based upon these considerations, the agency should make its

33
own decision in each case, subject to appellate review.

Such individual decision would not, however, promote uniformity.

It is difficult to say that one commissioner's judgment is better than
another's. 34 Perhaps a workable criterion upon which administrative
tribunals might rely would eventually evolve from the maze of in-

dividual decisions which would surely result under the balancingof-factors solution proposed by Professor Davis. However, in this

problem area if a workable and effective guideline can be developed
now without reliance on this time consuming process then it would

be wise to do so; according 3to5 Professor Davis, "No single and simple
answer can be satisfactory."

FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

ACT

The Federal Administrative Procedure Act3 ' does not attempt to
provide a solution to the problem of defining the scope of official
notice. The only relevant provision of the APA states that any party
can be afforded on request an opportunity to challenge noticed ma-

terial.37 No effort is made to formulate a workable rule or definition.
MODEL STATE ADMuNITRATIvE PiRocEDUE

Acr

Perhaps the best solution is set forth in the provisions on official
notice in the 1961 draft of the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act. Section 10(4) of the act, relating to contested cases, provides:
[N]otice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts. In addition, notice
may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the
agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or
during the hearing or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of
32. "For the problem involves the reconciliation of the need for full utilization of
experience . . . with the most essential ingredient of fair hearing-opportunity to know
and meet the materials on the other side. Our thesis is that the reconciliation can best
be accomplished by recognizing that the cardinal principle of fair hearing is not that
all facts should be in the record or that all facts should be subject to cross examination and rebuttal evidence, but rather that parties should have opportunity to meet
in the appropriate fashion any materials that influence decision. What is the appropriate
fashion for meeting the opposing materials depends upon the nature of the facts and
the circumstances .... " 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 344.
33. See note 27 supra.
34. See note 27 supra.
35. 2 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 344.
36. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
37. Section 7(d) of the APA reads in part: "Where any agency rests on official
notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, any party shall
on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show the contrary." 60 Stat. 242
(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958).
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the material noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they shall

be afforded an opportunity to contest the material so noticed. The agency's
experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized
in the evaluation of the evidence.38

This statute presupposes a delineation between taking notice of law
and of fact and does not specifically provide for notice of law. Legal
material is acquired in a different manner from "facts" and put to
use at some time prior to or other than the time at which the problem
of noticing extra-record material arises. No permission is given to
notice law because no permission is needed; it is one of the essential
tools of the administrative tribunal. The Model Code also recognizes
this distinction between law and fact but enumerates specifically the
categories of law which can be noticed. In this respect the Model Act
provides for a broader inclusion of legal materials by purposely
excluding law from the problem area of notice.
The Model Act specifically includes all judicially cognizable facts.
Perhaps even this grant is not broad enough. The agency should be
allowed to take notice of all judicially cognizable materials, not just
facts. Legal materials may in effect be noticed through the Model
Act's presupposition that no permission is needed to notice legal
material. However, unless one reads into the act the broadest possible
interpretation of the word "fact," some material which is not strictly
either fact or law may be excluded from notice. The act also brings
within the scope of notice the agency's expertise within its particular
field. Here, too, more should be permitted than the notice of scientific
and technical facts. The agency should be able to draw upon all of
its resources in its field, including records of prior proceedings and
other materials not strictly factual. 39
Official notice, as defined by the Model Act, differs only in degree
from the power of the trier of fact to call for argument on a question
or issue. Danger of prejudice to the parties is reduced by adequate
provisions for notification of the parties and by liberal opportunity
to challenge both the propriety of notice and the truth of the noticed
material, before or after notice has been taken. Such a flexible system
protects the interests of all the parties. Trial process is expedited by
allowing the agency to draw upon its resources, and fairness is upheld
by allowing reasonable challenge to the material thus brought into
play.
38. REvmsED MODEL STATE AnMImsTnArTVz PnocEDunE Act § 10(4) (1961).
39. Official notice as dealt with here involves not just the materials gathered and
collected by the agency in the performance of the adjudicative aspect of its dual
function, but includes all relevant materials available peculiarly to the agency concerning the particular subject, whether collected in the performance of its adjudicative
or legislative functions.
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of Cooperative

The first cooperatives in the United States were agricultural marketing associations.' To aid the development of associations such as
these, all states currently provide special statutory benefits for cooperatives. 2 Generally, these benefits include various reductions in
filing and franchise fees for incorporated cooperatives, 3 exemption
from the antitrust statutes of the state, 4 and less regulation than for
ordinary profit-making associations. 5 Statutory definitions of a cooperative usually include two elements. First, the association must have an
acceptable purpose; second, the association must possess certain organizational and operational characteristics. In a majority of states
the definition of a cooperative has unfortunately been strongly influenced by the early marketing associations. These definitions often
limit the acceptable purposes to agriculture, 6 rural electrification, and
a few others,8 thereby preventing many suitable associations from
organizing as cooperatives. Also, some of the organizational and
operational characteristics of present day definitions are inconsonant
with modem conditions and inapplicable to nonagricultural associations.9
1. Note, Agricultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. L.J. 353, 354 & nn.8&9 (1952).
2. These cooperative statutes have withstood various state constitutional attacks challenging them as special laws. E.g., In re Wyoming Valley Co-op. Ass'n, 198 Fed. 436
(M.D. Pa. 1912); Oregon Growers' Cooperative Ass'n. v. Lentz, 107 Ore. 561, 212 Pac.
811 (1923). See generally PACEL, TrE LAW OF ThE ORoANiZATION AND OPEnAmioN
or CooPE nvEs § 9(a), at 46-47 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as PACKM].
3. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 2, §§ 132-33 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 471-72
(Smith-Hurd 1954). See also PAcKL § 62(b).
4. This is normally true only for agricultural cooperatives, and is probably based on
the federal policy as set out in the Clapper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C.
§§ 291-92 (1958). For a discussion of this statute see Hanna, Antitrust Immunities of
Cooperative Associations, 13 LAw & CoNTEmP. PHROB. 488 (1948). However, the state
exemptions of cooperatives were thwarted temporarily by the United States Supreme
Court in Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902). The reasonableness
of such classification for antitrust purposes was ultimately upheld in Tigner v. Texas,
310 U.S. 141 (1940) (overruling Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., supra). Typical
state statutes which provide that agricultural cooperatives are not in restraint of trade
are: ALA. CODE tit. 2, §§ 69, 85 (1960) (see comments following these sections); GA.
CODE ANN. § 65-220 (1937); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 468 (Smith-Hurd 1954); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-331 (1956). For a general discussion of state antitrust exemptions
for cooperatives see Note, 27 VA. L. REv. 674 (1941).
5. PAcKEL §§ 63(c)-(d).
6. Every state allows the formation of cooperatives for agricultural purposes. See
UTAH CODE ANN. § 3-1-4 (1953); PACKEL § 9(b).
7. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 18, § 32 (1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-2503 (1956). The
Rural Electrification Administration has spearheaded the development of electric
cooperatives. Rural Electrification Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1363, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901-14
(1958).
8. Such as credit unions, see N.Y. Coop. Conr. LAW § 13, and mutual insurance,
see TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1601 (1956).
9. A typical example is the Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 41 (1958),
which is discussed in Packel, Fair Play for Cooperatives, 17 PA. B.A.Q. 310 (1946).
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Most of the proposed definitional changes have dealt with the
limitations on acceptable purposes. One response to the problem
created by such limitations has been for an association seeking to
operate as a cooperative, but unable to qualify under the cooperative
statute, to organize under the regular business association statute. 10
However, this does not cure any of the defects in existing cooperative definitions nor does it provide the non-qualifying association
with any of the statutory benefits available under the cooperative
statute.
A second approach has been to attempt to organize such a nonqualifying association under the state's nonprofit association statute."
Since the statutory benefits given to nonprofit associations are often
even more attractive than the benefits provided for cooperatives, 2
many associations have utilized this procedure regardless of their
ability to qualify under the cooperative statute. 13 Although it has
been argued that a cooperative makes no profit for itself,14 a cooperative should not be treated in the same manner as a nonprofit association since pecuniary benefit through services at cost for the members
is usually the paramount motive for its formation.' 5 Thus the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act specifically excludes from its provisions
10. PACKEL § 9(d). A cooperative seeking to utilize the general business association
statute may encounter certain problems, such as an inability to restrict the transfer of
its shares, an inability to purchase its own shares, or an inability to restrict voting or
capital return. Ibid. However, most states now allow a corporation to buy its-own
shares.

11. See PAcKEL § 9(c); Miller & Grossman, The Non-Profit Corporation or Association in the Non-Agricultural Field, 13 LAw & CoNTEmP. PRon. 463 (1948). But see
Legislation, 17 VMA. L. REv. 336, 340 (1963).
12. Many states exempt nonprofit associations from ad valorem, franchise, and
income taxes. Also, nonprofit associations are allowed a looser corporate structure
than are cooperatives.
13. For a discussion of the various enterprises which have utilized nonprofit statutes,
see Miller & Grossman, supranote 11.
14. PACKEL § 9(c), at 51. The exponents of cooperatives contend that since a
cooperative is obligated to render its services at cost for the members, it necessarily
makes no profit for itself. The debate concerning this feature of cooperatives has
centered around the income tax laws rather than the non-profit statutes. At present,
certain farmers' cooperatives are exempt from federal income taxes. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 521. However, the Code does not provide complete exemption. For the exact
tax treatment of these cooperatives and their patrons see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§
1381-88. See generally PATTERSON, THE TAX EXEMPTION OF COOPERATIVES (2d rev.

ed. 1961); Jacobs, Cooperatives and the Income Tax Law, 31 TAXES 49 (1953);
Magill & Merrill, The Taxable Income of Cooperatives, 49 Micn. L. REV. 167 (1950);
Sowards, Should Co-ops Pay Federal Income Tax?, 19 TENN. L. REV. 908 (1947).
15. "Cooperatives are definitely a part of the business enterprise operations of their
member-patrons."

IN 76 (1950).

JENSEN, CooPEnATrVE CORPORATE AssOcrATION LAW AN AccouNT-
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any association capable of qualifying under the state's cooperative
statute. 16
The third approach, as exemplified by the New York statute, 7 is
simply to increase the number of purposes for which a cooperative
may be formed. This approach is unsatisfactory for several reasons.
Enumerated purposes tend to become inadequate as social conditions
change. The effort, time, and expense necessary to convince the legislature to approve a new purpose is often a prohibitive burden for a
young association. Also, defining a cooperative according to specific
purposes leads to uncertainty when associations try to squeeze their
purposes into these small categories.
A better proposal for the solution of the purposes problem is to
allow the formation of a cooperative for any lawful purpose. 18 This
approach increases the availability of cooperative treatment without
resorting to piecemeal legislative action, eliminating the confusion and
inconvenience created by the New York type statutes. Constant revision of the definition to reflect changing social policies concerning
the acceptability of certain purposes is no longer necessary. Since
there appears to be no compelling reason to restrict the benefits of
cooperative organization to groups organized for particular purposes,
many states have amended their cooperative statutes in accordance
with this proposal. 19
ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL CHARa~cTEmSTICS

Existing definitions of a cooperative usually contain four basic
organizational and operational characteristics. To provide some guidelines for a modern definition these characteristics and the proposed
alternatives to each should be critically examined.
(1) The associationmust substantially return its annual earnings to
its patrons in proportionto the value of the annual business done by
each patronwith the association. This characteristic is essential to the
definition since the primary purpose of a cooperative is to benefit
members by providing services at cost rather than, as in ordinary
16. ABA-ALI MODEL NoNrOFrr Corn,. ACT § 4 (1957). However, a problem still
exists in states which have restrictive cooperative statutes since only those associations
able to qualify under the state cooperative statute are exempted from the Model Act.
This presents an additional reason for expanding the definition of cooperative so as to
include all the associations having the economic and organizational characteristics of a
cooperative.
17. N.Y. Coop. CoR,. LAw § 13.
18. See Bo=as, NONPROFrr CoaonAmoN STATUTES 23-24 (1957); PAcXM § 9(a),
at 47.
19. E.g., CAL. Con,'. CODE § 12201; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 619.01 (1956); Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 1729.28 (Baldwin 1963).
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business associations, to benefit capital investors. 20 Every state includes some form of this characteristic in its definition of a cooperative.
Most states which allow a cooperative to deal with nonmembers will
permit the cooperative to discriminate against nonmember patrons by
restricting the distribution of patronage refunds to members,2 1 reasoning that a cooperative is formed solely for the benefit of its members.
In many situations lack of patronage refunds to nonmembers may
conceivably allow the member-patrons to receive services at less than
cost. Since nonmember business is a legislative benefit grafted onto
the original theory of a cooperative, 2 it appears unfair to allow a
cooperative to exploit this privilege by operating as an ordinary business association towards its nonmember patrons and thus achieving
additional benefits for its members. Thus a cooperative should probably be required to distribute its patronage refunds equally to member
and nonmember patrons.2 3 A statute recently proposed for adoption
in Michigan allows a cooperative to adopt either approach for the
distribution of refunds.2 However, a cooperative is classified for the
purpose of taxes and fees according to its manner of refund distribution. If the cooperative distributes patronage refunds nondiscriminately, then it is classified as a nonprofit association, while if nonmember
patrons do not receive equal refunds then the cooperative is classified
as a profit association.1
(2) The associationmust not render more than a fixed percentage
of the annual value of its economic services to nonmembers. A "restriction on business activity with nonmembers is justified since the
basic concept of a cooperative is the performance of service for
members."27 Generally the states require that a cooperative do at least
fifty per cent of its annual business with members. The fifty per cent
20. "The most outstanding feature distinguishing cooperatives from other business
units, and perhaps the only prerequisite of cooperative status, is the method of distributing 'earnings'." BoYER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 10-11.
21. Statutes which allow discrimination against nonmember patrons are common.
E.g., CAL. Cons'. CODE § 12805. However, many cooperatives, particularly farmers'
cooperatives, will attempt to show equal treatment in order to qualify for federal
income tax exemption. See note 14 supra.
22. See Note, Agricultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. L.J. 353 n.7 (1952).
23. It is suggested that such a requirement is necessary to preserve the spirit of
cooperatives. Contra, Bo=, op. cit. supra note 18, at 13.
24. Id. at 130.
25. Ibid. However, there is another requirement for nonprofit classification, namely,
that there be no dividends or interest payments on capital. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 131. However, cooperatives in Massachusetts are unrestricted as to the
amount of nonmember business. MAss. ANNu. LAws ch. 157, § 1 (1959). This lack
of restriction may be due to an inadvertent legislative omission. Iowa prohibits any
nonmember business by livestock shipping cooperatives. IowA CODE ANrN. § 499.3
(1949).
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limitation gives a cooperative both a certain degree of flexibility in
its operations and a capacity to withstand periods of economic adversity among its members while still requiring it to fulfill the major
purpose of a cooperative-service to its members. This limitation also
prevents a small number of people from organizing as a cooperative
and then doing a large volume of nonmember business. This would
particularly be a problem in states which allow patronage refunds
only to members, thereby adding to the incentive to operate in this
manner.
(3) The association must allow only a limited return on invested
capital. Apparently all states include some limitation on capital return in the definition of a cooperative, with the allowable returns
ranging from five to eight per cent.2 Cooperatives were conceived
as associations for the benefit of consumer-members rather than investors. 29 A limitation on capital return, which deemphasizes the attractiveness of capital investment and channels the major pecuniary
benefits to be gained from a cooperative enterprise to the patrons as
refunds rather than to investors as dividends, is necessary to effectuate
this aspect of cooperative theory. The exact rate of return embodied
in a definition should envisage possible changes in the state of the
economy and take into account the capital needs of cooperatives.
This figure merely establishes the maximum return allowable
for a cooperative; it should be high enough to enable a cooperative
with capital needs to compete effectively in the money market, but
should probably never exceed the legal rate of interest.30 Considering
these factors a return of eight per cent should be adequate and is
also harmonious with several federal statutes concerning coopera&31
tives.

28. California allows a five per cent return by general cooperatives, but agricultural
cooperatives are allowed an eight per cent return. CAL. CoRP,. CoDe § 12805(a); CAL.
AGRic. CODE § 1200(i). This evidently shows a legislative intent to promote agricultural cooperatives more than other cooperatives. There appears to be no reason
why the capital return should vary, unless the risks in agriculture are thought to be
greater than in other areas. Massachusetts has a five per cent limit on all cooperatives.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 157, § 6(2) (1959). Some states allowing an eight per cent
return are Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 618.15 (1956); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. §§
499.23-.24 (1949); New York, N.Y. Coo'. ConP. LAw §§ 72,111; Ohio, Orno REv.
CoDE ANN. § 1729.10(f) (Baldwin 1963).
29. For a discussion of this principle see generally JEusEN, op. cit. supra note 15, at
48; PACE:EL § 1, at 3-5; Note, Agricultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. L.J. 353, 358-62
(1952); NoTE, General Principles and Problems of Cooperatives: An Introduction, 1954
Wis. L. REv. 533-35.

30. Bakken, Principles and Their Role in the Statutes Relating to Cooperatives, 1954
Wis. L. REv. 549, 563.

31. Section 1 of the Clapper-Volstead Act lists an eight per cent limitation on capital
return as one of the alternative requirements for federal antitrust exemption. 42 Stat.
388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1958). Also the federal income tax allows an exempt
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(4) The associationmust limit each member to one vote, regardless
of the number of shares held by the member. The one-man, one-vote
principle was a uniform feature of the first cooperatives. It represented a desire to introduce democratic procedure into the economic
sphere of society. 32 This further deemphasized the role of capital
investment in cooperativesP s More recent definitions of a cooperative
tend to eliminate this characteristic as a required feature.m The
tremendous growth of some cooperatives has made democratic control
difficult because of the dispersal and apathy of members.m Some states
allow a cooperative to adopt in either its charter or by-laws any
method of voting.m Other states, in response to the desire of large
patrons to have a larger voice in determining the policies of a cooperative, allow cooperatives to adopt either democratic voting or voting
according to patronage. 37 The patronage method is probably fairer
since the success of any cooperative depends to a great extent on
member participation. The major patrons are probably more interested
in the policies of a cooperative, and at least ostensibly will do nothing
inimical to the interests of the cooperative. However, the major
patrons should not be allowed to receive disproportionate refunds or
to discriminate in any way against the other member-patrons.m An
interesting compromise has been suggested by one writer whereby
voting for managerial personnel would be on a one-man, one-vote
basis, while voting on sales and fiscal policies would be on a patronage
basis. 9 Theoretically this would retain democratic voting in the
political area of the association while vesting economic control in the
members who do the most business with the cooperative. However,
this might not be palatable for many cooperatives since managerial
farmers' cooperative to make a capital return equal to the greater of eight per cent or
the legal rate of interest in the state. INT. BREv. CODE OF 1954, § 521(b) (2).
32. Note, Agricultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. L.J. 353, 360 (1952). See generally

BoYER, op. cit. supra note 18, at 16; PACKEL §§ 24(a)-(b); Bakken, Principles and
Their Role in the Statutes Relating to Cooperatives, 1954 Wis. L. B:v. 549, 555-57.
33. See Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 536-50 (1929) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). See generally authorities cited note 32 supra.
34. See Boys%, op. cit. supra note 18, at 130; however, still "approximately threefourths of the states restrict each member to one vote regardless of the amount of stock
owned or the extent of patronage ... .
Note, Agricultural Cooperatives, 27 IND. L.J.
353,360 (1952).
35. See BoYE, op. cit. supra note 18, at 16; Bakken, supra note 32, at 555.
36. PACKEL § 24(a). In states having no statutory limitation on voting, cooperatives
have adopted several different methods-voting according to capital investment, voting
according to patronage, democratic voting, or various combinations of these methods.
Approximately one-half of the states expressly limit, or empower the cooperative to
limit, the number of shares which can be owned by each member. Note, Agricultural
-Cooperatives,27 IND. L.J. 353, 360 (1952).
37. Bakken, supranote 32, at 556.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
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personnel normally run for office on fiscal policy platforms. Consider-

ing the history and philosophy of cooperatives, voting according to
capital investment should probably not be allowed in a modern

definition of a cooperative. 40 However, a definition should provide
several alternative methods of voting (such as democratic, patronage,
or a combination of these). Thus a cooperative would not be arbi-

trarily bound to one method of voting, but would be able to choose
the method best suited for its individual needs.

Full Faith and Credit-Procedures for
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments
The Constitution of the United States provides that "Full Faith and

Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State."' As to judgments,2 this

clause is based upon the policy of promoting certainty and finality
and bringing an end to litigation by preventing dissatisfied litigants
from relitigating in one state issues previously litigated in another

state.3 But full faith and credit does not require that a money judgment in one state be a basis for execution in a second state.4 The full

faith and credit clause 5 requires only that such a foreign judgment be
an indefeasible cause of action on which a new judgment shall be

rendered in the second state.6 Since there is no uniform system of
enforcing foreign 7 money judgments in the United States, the question

40. Unless the state constitution requires voting by shares in all corporations. See
PACKEL, §§ 24(a)-(b). For a discussion supporting this textual statement see generally

authorities cited note 29 supra.
1. U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
2. This discussion is confined to money judgments and leaves out of consideration all
other judgments, such as judgments for the defendant.
3. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
4. RESTATEmENT, CoNucr oF LAws § 433 (1934).
5. Pursuant to the full faith and credit clause, the first session of Congress enacted
the following legislation cited in pertinent part: "And the said records and judicial
proceedings, so authenticated, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every
court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
State from which they are taken." REv. STAT. § 905 (1875). This statute has not
been modified in any material way in regard to judgments. Therefore, alldecisions
regarding the effect of full faith and credit are under the statute and not under the
Constitution itself.
6. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); see LEuvLA, CoNsucTs oF LAws §
71 (1959).
7. In the United States, a judgment is considered foreign not only when rendered
by a foreign nation, but also when rendered by a sister state. In this discussion, the
term "foreign" will be restricted to those judgments arising in a sister state.
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remains, given the constitutional manlate, as to the procedure for
effectuating the required faith and credit. This problem is the basis of
the instant discussion.
The traditional common law procedure for enforcing a foreign
judgment requires that a new action upon the judgment be brought
in the state in which enforcement is desired.8 After a new judgment is
rendered, execution or other enforcement procedure is issued upon it.
The rationale for this is that the judgment constitutes a settlement of
rights by private parties and "that execution will not issue immediately
upon a foreign judgment in its character as a judgment, but the
obligation which it is deemed to impose must be reduced to a judgment in the forum by a new action in order to be executed." 9 Such a
procedure is unsatisfactory in that it results in unnecessary delay ° and
expense, and creates difficulties due to the necessity of securing jurisdiction over the person of the judgment debtor." This discussion will
consider two aspects of the problem: first, the appropriate procedure,
whether summary judgment or direct registration in the second state;
second, the source of any new procedure, whether state law or federal
law.
TYPE oF PROCEDURE

Several alternatives have been proposed to alleviate the cumbersome formality of a new suit and new judgment. One alternative is a
procedure whereby the judgment is registered in the state where
execution is desired. Thereafter, the judgment has all the force and
effect of a local judgment without the necessity of bringing a new
action. Such a procedure has been adopted in the federal court
system permitting registration of judgments of federal courts in all
districts of the nation, 2 but no such provision exists for state judgments. England 13 and Australia 14 have substantially similar proce8. See Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law,
33 MicH. L. REv. 1129, 1136 (1935).
9. Id. at 1144.

10. This was dramatically illustrated in Tolley v. Wilson, 212 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d
177 (1947), where a money judgment obtained in Kansas was sued upon in Arkansas
for the purpose of reaching land in Arkansas which was owned by the judgment
debtor. But before a new judgment was rendered in Arkansas in order that a judgment lien could arise, the judgment debtor sold the land to thwart recovery on the
judgment. This case is discussed in Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a
Sister State, 42 IowA L. REV. 202 (1957).
11. Yntema, supra note 8, at 1164-65. "The system may be good for the business
of lawyers but little else can be said for it." Paulsen, supra note 10, at 202.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958).
13. Part II of the Administration of Justice Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 81; see
DrcEy, CoxricT oF LAws 979-1055 (7th ed. 1958); READ, REcormMON AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGmENTs iN

Col rouw

=
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TH 296-310 (1938).

14. "The Australian legislation for the enforcement of sister State judgments is the
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dures. The registration procedure has speed, convenience, and other
advantages. The judgment creditor can obtain the same judgment
lien on real property that is available to holders of judgments of the
court of registration, and the registering court's execution of process is
immediately available to him. 15 The judgment creditor may also
proceed by ancillary writ of garnishment provided by the registering
state to its own judgment creditors. 16
The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws became
cognizant of the problems involved in the enforcement of foreign
judgments and initially determined to propose a uniform law employing a registration procedure.17 Although the Commissioners seem to
have been of the opinion that the procedure would not violate due
process, they recognized that doubt as to the constitutionality of the
registration procedure might jeopardize its adoption by the states. 18
Therefore, a summary judgment procedure was approved in 1948.19
The Uniform Act permits registration of the foreign judgment in any
court having jurisdiction of such an action.20 At any time after registration, the judgment creditor is entitled to have summons issued and
served upon the judgment debtor as in an action brought upon the
foreign judgment, 21 and a levy may be made upon any property of the
judgment debtor which is subject to execution or other judicial process
for satisfaction of judgments in that state.22 If the judgment debtor
Commonwealth Service and Execution of Process Act. . . . [Tihe Act provides . . .
that a person in whose favor a judgment has been given in a State court, -nay obtain
a certificate of the judgment from a proper officer of the court. He may then register
that judgment by producing the certificate to a proper officer of a court of like jurisdiction in some other State or part of the Commonwealth. From the date of registration,
the judgment has the same force and effect, and the same proceedings may be taken
upon it, as if the judgment had originally been pronounced in that court." CowEN,
BurAxEnAm STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, No. 8, AmERICAN-AsTRALIAN
PIVATE INTERNAIONAL LAW 79 (1957).
15. Paulsen, supranote 10, at 218.
16. Gullet v. Gullet, 188 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1951).
17. See Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 336
(1949) (Dean Leflar, the draftsman of the Uniform Act, sets forth the history of the
Act and considerations entering its formulation).
18. "It was generally agreed that a judgment registration statute could be drafted for
state enactment in a form that would almost surely withstand any attack upon its
constitutionality which might reach the Supreme Court of the United States. Whether
the highest courts of all the states would arrive at the same result was of course a more
uncertain matter and the fact that some lawyer-legislators might have doubts as to the
act's constitutionality, even though the Commissioners did not, was a fact not to be
overlooked." Id. at 347.
19. UNwoRu ENFoRcEnmNT OF FOREIGN JuDmENTs Act [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM AcT].

20. UNwoRm AcT § 2.
21. UNI
moM
Act § 4.
22. UNwoRm AcT § 6. "The right to levy on property of the judgment debtor at once
after registration of the judgment, without waiting until the registered judgment becomes a final judgment of the state of registration, can operate to give to judgment
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fails to plead within sixty days after personal jurisdiction has been
obtained over him, or if the court after hearing has refused to set
the registration aside, the registered judgment shall become a final
personal judgment in the court of registration.23 If personal jurisdiction of the judgment debtor is not secured within sixty days after
levy and he has not acted to set aside the registration, the registered
judgment shall be a final judgment quasi in rem of the court in which
it is registered.2 4 The Uniform Act is an improvement over the common law procedure of a separate action, but it is not as inexpensive
and efficient as the registration procedure. In addition, the Uniform
Act lacks some substantive advantages available under the registration procedure. For example, until levy upon a specific piece of
property or the entry of a new personal judgment, the Uniform Act
does not create a lien on real property as would be created by a
25
registration procedure.
Registration is the more advantageous method of enforcing foreign
judgments, not only from the standpoint of lessened expense and
greater protection afforded to the judgment creditor, but also from
the consideration of administrative ease which might lessen some of
the burden on already crowded court dockets. In addition, a registration procedure would perhaps solve the existing problem of nonfinal judgments. The Supreme Court has held that full faith and
credit does not require enforcement of a "judgment for future alimony
... [where] the right to demand and receive such future alimony is
"2 The
discreti6nary with the court which rendered the decree ... .
a
judgment.
underlying problem is the modifiable character of such
Thus if under the registration procedure F-2 is to treat a registered F-1
judgment in the same manner it would treat an. F-2 judgment on a
similar cause of action, then F-2 should enforce even a modifiable
,
registered F-1 decree.27 '
Such a registration procedure would not seem to transgress due
process prohibitions.2 8 Due process requires only that the litigant
have one opportunity for a fair hearing.2 9 It does not require that he
creditors a type of relief almost as efficient as would be the case if execution could be
issued directly on the foreign judgment." Commissioners' Note, 9A UNoIFRM LAws
AN-N. 292 (1957).
23. UNwoam Acr § 7.
24. UNI'o~mv AcT- § 12.
-25. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 220.
26. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 17 (1910).
27. As to the scope of the problem and for remedies aimed at alleviating some of
the hardships of enforcing a non-final judgment in'a foreign jurisdiction, see Scoles,
Enforcement of Foreign "Non-Final" Alimony and Support Orders, 53 COLum. L. REv.
817 (1953).
28. LxLAR, supra note 6. See Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, 28 YALE LJ. 421 (1919).
29. "A hearing before- judgment, with full opportunity to present all the evidence and'
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be permitted later to raise new defenses or to show that the judgment
was based upon a mistake of law. 30 However, the defendant must be
permitted to attack the validity of the judgment on such grounds as
the lack of jurisdiction of the court rendering it" and failure of the
trial court to meet requirements of proper judicial proceedings. 2 If
the defendant is permitted to raise such defenses, then the registration
procedure appears to satisfy due process.
SouRcE OF PROCEDURE

At least two courses of action are available to secure adoption of a
registration procedure in the United States. One would be for the
National Conference of Uniform Commissioners to reconsider the
Uniform Act and adopt their original proposal for a registration of
judgments. However, this has the inherent weakness of all uniform
acts, that is, its adoption by all states is not assured.33 A far preferable34 method is a federal statute pursuant to the full faith and
credit clause's provision that the "Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings
shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." 3 5 To permit the discretionary
adoption of a procedure for enforcing foreign judgments pursuant to
the mandate of the full faith and credit clause appears to be relegating
to local discretion a subject of overriding national interest.
The very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the status
the arguments which the party deems important, is all that can be adjudged vital. Rehearings, new trials, are not essential to due process of law, either in judicial or administrative proceedings. One hearing, if ample, before judgment, satisfies the demand of
the Constitution in this respect." Pittsburgh, C., C., & St. L. By. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421,
426-27 (1894).
30. Milliken v. Myer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
31. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
32. "In order that the foreign proceedings be called judicial action and their results
be given effect as a judgment, it seems necessary that the defendant in the litigation
shall have been given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard before an impartial tribunal designated to hear and decide such questions as were involved." COODiucH, CoNFrars OF LAws § 205 (3d ed. 1949).

33. To date, only eight states have adopted the Uniform Act: Arkansas, Illinois,
Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 9A UNFOPm
LAws ANx. 287 (1957).

34. Even though Congressional action is the preferable course, it is recognized that
Congress might be reluctant to enact a form of legislation which may be deemed as
transgressing upon the rights of the states. Therefore, adoption of a registration procedure by the National Conference of Commissioners is also urged.
35. U. S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. "From the history of the clause, as well as from its
wording, it may be said to be clear that under any fair interpretation of the grant of
power to Congress in the full faith and credit clause, that body can provide for the
enforcement of state judgments in other states, without the wholly useless and unnecessary process of requiring a new suit on the same and the obtaining of a new judgment upon which execution can be had." Cook, supra note 28, at 430.
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of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore
obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the
others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which
a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective
of the state of its origin. That purpose ought not lightly to be set aside out
of deference to a local policy which, if it exists, would seem to be too trivial
to merit serious consideration when weighed against the policy of the constitutional provision and the interest of the state whose judgment is challenged.36

Federal rather than state law should prescribe the measure of credit

which one state shall give to another's judgment.3 7 Should Congress
exercise its constitutional power by an enactment of a registration
procedure applicable to states, the enforcement of foreign judgments

would be simplified and greater safety afforded litigants in our mobile
society.

PIOPOSED STATUTE
The following statute is proposed:
(a) A judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property entered
in the court of any state which has become final upon appeal or expiration of time for appeal or other condition precedent for finality may be
registered in any other state by filing therein a certified copy of such
judgment. A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a
judgment of a state court of the state where registered and may be
enforced in like manner. 38
(b) A notice summons clearly designating the foreign judgment and reciting
the fact of registration, the court in which it is registered, and the
time allowed for pleading, shall be sent by the clerk of the registering
court by registered mail to the last known address of the judgment
debtor. Proof of such mailing shall be made by certificate of the clerk 3 9
(c) Any defense which under the law of the state where registered may be
asserted by the defendant in an action on the foreign judgment may be
presented by appropriate pleadings and the issues raised thereby shall
be tried and determined as in other civil actions.40
36. Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
37. Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUm.
L. REv. 153, 161-62 (1949).

38. This is modeled substantially on the federal registration statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1963 (1958).

39. Notification by publication would not seem an adequate safeguard of the interest
of the judgment debtor. On the other hand, to require personal service on a judgment
debtor who may not be in the jurisdiction may defeat the registration procedure.
Therefore, a compromise by means of notification by registered mail is suggested. This
form of notification should adequately inform the judgment debtor of the registration of
the judgment and at the same time prevent him from avoiding its effect by eluding

personal service.
40. This is modeled substantially after § 8 of the Uniform Act. The Commissioners'
note in regard to this section states: "Under the full faith and credit clause, there are
certain defenses, particularly lack of jurisdiction in the court rendering the judgment,
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(d) Judgment within the meaning of this statute shall include any decree or
order for alimony or support which is enforceable in the state of rendition, even though modifiable in that state.
payment of the judgment and fraud or collusion in its procurement, which the judgment
drafted as to secure a judgment debtor the essentials of due process of law in minimum
form, at the same time giving him reasonable opportunity to present every defense which
debtor may properly raise in a later suit on the judgment. The uniform act is so
under the law he is entitled to present" 9A Uzwom LAws ANx. 293 (1957).

